[dragon53]

Am I correct in thinking the USAF never has officially credited Rex Barber with downing Adm. Yamamoto?

[flyXwire]

Originally Posted by dragon53

Am I correct in thinking the USAF never has officially credited Rex Barber with downing Adm. Yamamoto?

Probably because the accounts from both camps will never be resolved and the jury is still out on that.

Capt. Thomas Lanphier always maintained that he brought down Yamamoto, while Rex Barber told it differently, saying he was free of the Zeros when he saw Holmes fire on the Betty. Depending on whose account you want to believe the controversy will never be resolved itself, though Tom Lanphier gets awarded with the medal and official recognition.

[lanslide]

Here is a copy of the chapter that my father, James F. Lansdale, wrote for the Schiffer Publication "13th Fighter Command In WWII" as follows:

Fighters Under the Southern Cross: Death of the Admiral
© James F. Lansdale

The coded message sent on 13 April 1943 by a staff officer for Rear Admiral Jinichi Kusaka, Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s No.11 Air Fleet (Southeastern Area), sealed the fate of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. As translated by American cryptographers it read:

“On 18 April, CinC Combined Fleet [Admiral Yamamoto] will visit Ballale Base
(RXZ), Shortland Base [RWH], and Buin Base [RXP], in accordance with the following schedule:
1. Depart Rabaul [RR] at 0600 in medium attack plane [Type 1 “Betty”] escorted by six fighters [Type 0]. Arrive at Ballale Base at 0800. Proceed by [subchaser] to Shortland Base arriving at 0840 (No.1 Base Force to ready one boat). Depart Shortland Base at 0945 in above [subchaser] and arrive Ballale Base at 1030 (For transportation purposes, have ready an assault boat at Shortland Base and a motor launch at Ballale Base). Depart Ballale Base at 1100 in medium attack plane and arrive Buin Base at 1110. Lunch at No.1 Base Force Headquarters (Senior Staff Officer of No.26 Air Flotilla to be present). Depart Buin Base at 1400 in medium attack plane and arrive Rabaul at 1540.
2. At each of the above places the CinC will make short tour of inspection and at No.1 Base Force hospital he will visit the sick and wounded, but current operations should continue.
3. [Uniforms will be the uniforms for the day except that] each force commander [will be in combat attire with decorations].
4. In case of bad weather the trip will be postponed one day.”

The background of events leading to the transmission of Kusaka’s coded message unfolded many months before. The expansion of the Japanese perimeter in the southern sectors of the Pacific Ocean battlefronts had been contained as early as May 1942. The first Japanese attempts to secure the strategic area around Port Moresby had been thwarted by forcing the retreat of the Japanese invasion fleet following the Battle of the Coral Sea. In June of the same year, the American victory at the Battle of Midway had resulted in the decimation of the Japanese carrier strength needed to support any future large-scale invasions. The only venue left for the Japanese in order to secure a strangle hold on Australia was to island-hop down the Solomon Islands chain, thus cutting off the vital supply lines from the United States.

Independent of Japanese Army Command, the Imperial Japanese naval forces, on the orders of Yamamoto, had begun a clandestine airfield construction project on Guadalcanal in July. As related in earlier chapters of this book, the American invasion of Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 had brought Army Air Force fighter squadrons onto the island. After many months of hard-fought battles, on 4 January 1943, Yamamoto was forced to announce the decision to evacuate Guadalcanal as contained in Imperial GHQ Navy Staff Directive No.23. This was a bitter pill for Yamamoto to swallow! In the New Guinea area, the Japanese Army had suffered a defeat at Buna following an earlier retreat from Rabi. Now, Operation Ke, the evacuation of Guadalcanal, had been scheduled to begin on 1 February and was successfully completed six days later. The months of February and March brought the aerial battles over Guadalcanal to a crescendo.

Desperate to slow the Allied advances, the Imperial Japanese Army Command and Admiral Yamamoto planned and set into motion two limited offensive operations in March and April of 1943. The first occurred to the west of Rabaul. The Imperial Japanese Army conducted an operation intended to strengthen its forces near Lae, N.G. by dispatching reinforcements numbering 7,000 troops. The Japanese Army began to transport the 18th Army Headquarters and the 51st Army Division by sea March 2. The eight transports and escorting destroyers were caught in the daylight by Allied air forces on open water. For three days, the troops suffered thousands of casualties in the resulting attacks, which literally turned the Bismarck Sea red with the blood of the dead and wounded. (N.B. See “Battle of the Bismarck Sea” by Lex McAulay). The Bismarck Sea disaster had demonstrated the growing prowess of Allied air power in New Guinea and the Solomons. Yamamoto, therefore sought to neutralize this air power by initiating a second and more intensive offensive aerial operation against Guadalcanal. The code letters used by the Japanese for the Guadalcanal airbase was “RXI” and Yamamoto had designated the operation he would personally command as I-Go Sakusen.

Martin Caidin made available to the author a manuscript by Masatake Okumiya that Caidin utilized in his 1956 book Zero! The details of Admiral Yamamoto’s I-Go Sakusen. are excellently outlined as written by Commander Okumiya who served as the air staff officer for Rear Admiral Kakuta, Kakuji, CinC of the No.2 Carrier Division. Okumiya wrote:

“Admiral Yamamoto personally assumed the command of his air forces in the theater. He established his advanced command headquarters [on 3 April 1943] at Rabaul, intending specifically to direct all air activities toward the destruction of enemy air power in the area. This operation was named I-Go Sakusen. Admiral Yamamoto established No.21 Koku Sentai [Air Flotilla] headquarters at Kavieng [Northern New Ireland] under the command of Rear Admiral Ichimaru, Rinosuke. He also dispatched No.26 Koku Sentai to Buin Base [Southern Bougainville] under the command of Rear Admiral Kosaka, Kanae. The air groups of No.1 Koku Sentai [Carrier Division], under Vice Admiral Ozawa, Jisaburo, flew into Rabaul. Also placed at Rabaul was the main body [of aircraft] from No.21 Koku Sentai. The air groups of No.2 Koku Sentai, under the command of Rear Admiral Kakuta, Kakuji, remained at Rabaul only when not in action. When attacking Guadalcanal, No.2 Koku Sentai advanced its headquarters to Ballale Island Base.

Admiral Yamamoto had immediately available a total strength of approximately 350 aircraft, including some 190 [189] under the command of Vice Admiral Kusaka [CinC of No.11 Air Fleet consisting of Nos.21 and 26 Air Flotillas] as well as, some 160 [150] carrier-based aircraft under the command of Vice Admiral Ozawa. The latter had replaced Vice Admiral Nagumo, Chuichi. [Thus, Vice Admiral Ozawa now was CinC of the major aircraft carriers of No.3 Fleet, organized into Nos.1 and 2 Carrier Divisions].

On April 7, 1943, the attack began in full force when our aircraft, in great strength, raided a concentration of enemy ships anchored around Guadalcanal. On April 11, we attacked enemy ships in Oro Bay and Harvey Bay on the eastern coast of New Guinea. On April 12, our aircraft raided Port Moresby air bases and on April 14, we attacked the Milne Bay air base on southeastern coast of New Guinea as well as enemy ships in the harbor. … Our pilots overestimated the efficiency of the attacks [as revealed by postwar investigations, the Americans had actually suffered less damage than we believed at the time]. Our own losses consisted of at least 49 [N.B. actually forty-three confirmed] aircraft shot down or not returned to base [N.B. actually a further eighteen did not return or were written-off], as well as those, which were damaged.

Convinced by the reports that the attacks had reduced the effectiveness of the enemy air power and that his original goal of wreaking havoc among the Americans had been achieved, Admiral Yamamoto declared I-Go Sakusen had concluded successfully on April 16. He then ordered the land-based air forces [No.11 Air Flotilla] to resume their original operations and he sent the original carrier-based aircraft back to Truk to rejoin their parent carriers [of No. 3 Fleet].”

(N.B. For more detailed accounts of I-Go Sakusen, the reader is directed to Japanese Monograph No.99 “Southeast Area Naval Operations, Part II,” p.p. 13-16 and Japanese Monograph No.122 “Outline of Southeast Area Naval Air Operations, Part III, p.p.34-45.)

By 13 April, Yamamoto had decided to make an impromptu visit and inspection tour of the forward bases in the Shortland Islands and on Southern Bougainville. Following this decision, the area commanders were informed of Yamamoto’s itinerary via a coded radio transmission. Japanese radio messages were being routinely monitored and, having knowledge of the Japanese code systems, it was not surprising that Kusaka’s message had been intercepted and analyzed by American cryptographers. That the message was authored or ordered by Kusaka has now been established. As translated, the coded message stated, “From: CinC Southeastern Air Fleet.” American intelligence, at that time, was not aware that the commander of the Southeast Area Fleet and its attached air fleet, No.11 Koku Sentai, were one and the same person, Rear Admiral Kusaka. Following a flurry of communications between the crypto-analysts, various field commanders, and parties in Washington, the decision was reached to attempt to kill Yamamoto. U.S. Pacific Fleet CinC, Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey’s, terse wire message of 14 April said it all, “TALLYHO X LET’S GET THE BASTARD.”

Halsey turned the mission planning and selection of crews to Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, Commander Air, Solomons (COMAIRSOL), whose headquarters was located on Guadalcanal. As the planning unfolded, it was decided that the intercept would be accomplished using the Lockheed P-38 Lightnings shared by the 347th and 18th Fighter Groups flying from the fighter base near Henderson Field, Fighter 2. Special, 310-gallon long-range belly tanks were requisitioned and flown in. The crew selections were left to the 347th group commander, Lt. Col. Henry Vicellio and Lt. Col. Aaron W. Tyer, leader of the 18th Fighter Group. The 13th Fighter Command was in the process of reassigning some of the squadrons and pilots into a restructured table of organization. The pilots chosen for the mission had originally been assigned to different squadrons and it is not always possible to define precisely their true squadron affiliation in April. Some, such as Rex Barber, Ray Hine and Jim McLanahan, had only recently been officially transferred to the 339th Fighter Squadron. In the event, the original eighteen pilots selected for the Yamamoto Mission were as follows:
From the 347th Fighter Group
First Section (High Cover)
Major John W. Mitchell, 339th Fighter Squadron C.O., Mission Leader
1st Lt. Julius J. Jacobson, 339th F.S., Wingman
1st Lt. Douglas S. Canning, 339th F.S. Element Leader
1st Lt. Delton C. Goerke, 339th F.S., Wingman
Spare Element
1st Lt. Besby T. Holmes, 339th F.S., Element Leader
1st Lt. Raymond K. Hine, 339th F.S., Wingman
Second Section (Attack Section)
Capt. Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr., 70th Fighter Squadron, Section Leader
1st Lt. Rex T. Barber, 339th F.S., Wingman
1st Lt. Joseph F. Moore, 70th F.S., Element Leader
1st Lt. James D. McLanahan, 339th F.S. Wingman
From the 18th Fighter Group
First Section (High Cover)
Major Louis R. Kittel, 12th Fighter Squadron, Acting C.O.
2nd Lt. Gordon Whittaker, 12th F.S., Wingman
1st Lt. Roger J. Ames, 12th F.S., Element Leader
1st Lt. Lawrence A. Graebner, 12th F.S., Wingman
Second Section (High Cover)
1st Lt. Everett H. Anglin, 12th Fighter Squadron, Section Leader
1st Lt. William K. Smith, 12th F.S., Wingman
1st Lt. Eldon E. Stratton, 12th F.S, Element Leader
1st Lt. Albert R. Long, 12th F.S., Wingman

After lengthy discussion and debate, it was left up to Mitchell to make the final decision on the method of the attack, scheduled for the morning of the 18th. Mitchell, candidly admitting he could not recognize a “subchaser from a sub” chose to attack Yamamoto from the air rather than on the surface. The final details of the flight were made or decided upon by Mitchell whose only special request was for a “good compass” because the compasses usually provided in the Lightnings were unreliable. A minor setback occurred when it was found that only half of the 310-gallon belly tanks needed for the mission would be supplied. This meant that the Lightnings would each be flying with a normal 165-gallon external tank and only one each of the special 310-gallon tanks being flown in from Port Moresby.

A Definitive Account of the Yamamoto Mission: 18 April 1943

When Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Combined Fleet departed from the East Airfield (Lakunai) at Rabaul at 0610 18 April 1943 (Tokyo D/T), he became the target in one of the most famous and controversial missions of World War Two. In the Foreword of the book by R. Cargill Hall, “Lightning Over Bougainville” (Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington: and London: 1991), Tom D. Crouch wrote:

“The Yamamoto mission is the best-known and most thoroughly studied fighter engagement of the Pacific War. It may well be the most celebrated sortie ever flown by American fighter pilots. The participants, American and Japanese, have been interviewed repeatedly and at length. The action has been dissected from every possible angle. Futile attempts have been made to reduce the chaotic movement of the twenty-four assorted Lightnings, Zeros, and Bettys to a series of neat lines on paper. Yet, for all that effort we have still not satisfied our curiosity as to precisely what occurred in the air over Bougainville on that morning almost half a century ago.”

The Mission

It was 0710 (local D/T) Easter Sunday 1943 when John Mitchell released the brakes of his P-38 on Fighter 2 to lead seventeen other pilots on the longest aerial interception mission of World War II. Mitchell, in P-38 No.110, along with Jacobson in No.144, taxied into position and took off. Trailing Mitchell were Doug Canning, Del Goerke, Besby Holmes, in No.100, and Ray Hine, in No.102. Tom Lanphier, in No.122 “Phoebe,” was next with Rex Barber in No.147 “Miss Virginia.” “Miss Virginia” had been Bob Petit’s Lightning, however, Petit had rotated back to the States after having served two combat tours on Guadalcanal. Joe Moore taxied forward to the take-off position. Unfortunately, Moore’s wingman, Jim McLanahan, in No.116 “Lady Luck” was not “lucky”! As McLanahan taxied onto the Marston matting, a tire caught a sharp edge of the steel, blew-out, and left him stranded from the mission. Lou Kittel and his 12th Fighter Squadron representatives were the last to depart on the over four-hundred-mile, minimum altitude mission. Kittel was flying Barber’s old No.125 with “Daisy 2nd” chalked on the nose. Barber had damaged the port wing of No.125 during an attack on a Japanese subchaser last week of March, but it had been repaired in time for the mission with a wing taken from No.138, “Old Ironsides,” in the boneyard.

While forming up, Moore could not get the jury-rigged 310-gallon external tank to feed properly. Using hand signals, Moore informed Mitchell of the problem. Moore, in utter disappointment and frustration, was forced to turn around and head back to Fighter 2. The attack section now only consisted of two pilots, Lanphier and Barber! Mitchell signaled the two spare pilots, Holmes and Hine, to fill-in Lanphier’s section. Flying at only thirty or forty feet over the water in order to avoid Japanese detection, the remaining Lightnings followed Mitchell’s course; “265° for 55 minutes, 290° for 27 minutes, 305° for 38 minutes, and 20° for 5 minutes.” Mitchell had planned an additional sixteen minutes for climbing to station at the intercept altitude. This was to have been followed by a fifth leg of “90° for 21 minutes” if additional search time had been needed. Just as the pilots, still low over the water and straining to catch a glimpse of Bougainville, turned on their fourth leg, their quarry was spotted. Canning, whose keen vision was legendary, broke the radio silence, with a low, almost too calm, message, “Bogeys. Eleven o’clock high.”

Lanphier’s attack section, climbing along with the cover sections, fire-walled the throttles. Mitchell ordered the dropping of the external fuel tanks as the Lightnings rocketed for altitude. Lanphier and Barber adjusted their course for the interception of the two Betty bombers. At that moment, Holmes announced he could not drop his tanks. With Hine covering his wing, Holmes turned south-southeast along the Bougainville coast, horsing his Lightning in an attempt to jerk the belly tanks off. The attack section was, for the second time during the mission, down to only Lanphier and Barber!

What happened in the next few minutes to Lanphier and Barber has subsequently led to much debate, controversy, and acrimony. The attack on and the victory claim for the Betty bomber carrying Yamamoto is the most contentious aspect of the legendary mission. Lanphier and Barber both have claimed the distinction of bringing down Admiral Yamamoto. Contemporary documentation is sparse, but does exist. In the years following the death of Yamamoto and after dozens of interviews, magazine articles, books, and symposia, as well as legal forums doubts regarding what actually happened during the attack still remain. What is clear is that the official U.S. Air Force position on this issue has been to rely on their contemporary records. Tom Lanphier’s position also was to legitimize and substantiate his claims by relying on the same official records. There are three pertinent and contemporary documents available for examination, which do focus very precise light on the events as they transpired at the time. These three essential documents regarding the Yamamoto interception are:

A. 13th Fighter Command’s official "Fighter Interception Report” for April 18, 1943.

An original typed copy of the four-page “Fighter Interception Report: April 18, 1943,” was to have been given to each of the participants. Douglas S. Canning provided the authors with the copies given to him and to wingman, Delton C. Goerke. The Goerke copy is one quoted below as “FIR”

B. The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki.

Admiral Matome Ugaki served as Yamamoto’s chief of staff. Ugaki was on board the second Betty bomber shot down during the Yamamoto Mission. He was severely injured in the crash of the Betty. However, after hospitalization, he recovered his health and returned to active duty. Ugaki maintained a personal and detailed diary of his service career. On the first anniversary of the Yamamoto Mission, 18 April 1944, Ugaki detailed and recorded from memory the events of the previous April. After the war, the Ugaki diary was translated by Masataka Chihaya; edited by Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon; and published as “Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941-1945” by the University of Pittsburgh Press. Popularizing in English the writings of Ugaki was a daunting task. Subtle nuances and some syntax changed in the published text. Therefore, the services of historian and native Japanese, Dr. Minoru Kawamoto, were commissioned for this work in order to provide a more literal, and, hopefully, more precise translation of the Ugaki Diary entries. It is the Dr. Kawamoto translation from an original copy of the Ugaki Diary which has been used for this study. Dr. Kawamoto, in providing his translation wrote this author; “There is general criticism (in Japan) that the Ugaki Diary entry for April 18, 1944, is not entirely correct. Memories being frail are apt to be fraught with mistakes. However, who else was there to give a first hand account of what happened that morning within one of the two targeted planes and so close to the facts?” [Italics added]. The Dr. Kawamoto translation is quoted herein below as “Ugaki.”

C. The Official Autopsy Report and Autopsy Record of Admiral Yamamoto.

After the recovery of Yamamoto’s remains from the crash site, an official autopsy was conducted and a record of findings made by Lt. Commander Jisaburo Tabuchi, chief medical officer of No.1 Base Unit. After the war, Dr. Tabuchi operated a clinic in Saidaiji, Okayama Prefecture. Dr. Tabuchi retained copies of his autopsy report and other records. He provided copies of the documents to Hiroyuki Agawa. Agawa is the noted Yamamoto biographer and published Dr. Tabuchi’s report of Yamamoto autopsy in the book, “The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy” published by Kodansha International Limited in 1979. The findings of the Yamamoto autopsy, which was conducted on 20 April 1943 at Buin Base, are quoted below as being from “Agawa”.

Subsequent evidence, testimony, and examination of collaborative records have resulted in the discovery of some errors in detail and or conclusions contained in the documents. Yet, these same documents still provide a precise chronology, as well, as primary evidence for what actually occurred in the first few minutes of the attack on Admiral Yamamoto. Each of the events below have been taken directly from the contemporary records!

The Yamamoto Mission: Contemporary Records

Yamamotos’s staff boarded the two standard Betty bombers, Nos. [323] and [326], attached to No.705 Kaigun Kokutai (Naval Air Group) at Rabaul’s East Airfield and departed at 0610 (Tokyo D/T). Yamamoto sat in the navigator’s seat, immediately behind the pilot on the starboard side of Betty, call number [323], Mitsubishi serial number 2656. The itinerary had called for Ballale Island Base to be the first landing of Yamamoto’s inspection tour. However, the pilot’s log for Betty, call number [326], in which Ugaki was riding, records that the scheduled flight was to be from “RRF” (Rabaul Airfield) to “RWP” (Buin Anchorage). The code for Buin Base was “RXP” and the Ballale Base code was ‘RXZ.” It is possible that the use of the letters “RWP” in the pilot’s log were used to indicate either or both airfields in the Buin Anchorage area. In the event, both bombers and the six escorting Zero fighters from No.204 Kaigun Kokutai flew a southeasterly course from Rabaul toward the southwestern coast of Bougainville and the Buin base area.

Ugaki: “No. 2 plane [326] (was) diagonally behind (and) left of No.1 plane [323]. Formation beautiful. At times (I) worried wingtips would touch. (I) could plainly make out the side view of CinC sitting in the plane commander’s seat [behind the pilot, starboard side] also those moving about in the cabin. As the landscape and objects below were being explained, based on aerial map, (I) was able to enjoy a feeling of a good flight.

When approaching the west side of Bougainville Island, flying in a straight line at an altitude of seven-eight hundred meters over flat jungle, the plane’s captain handed me a piece of paper. It said, “Scheduled to arrive Ballale at 0745”. Looking at my wristwatch (I noted) it was exactly 0730. “Another fifteen minutes to go”, I reminded myself. Just then, all of a sudden, our plane started to dive, following No. 1 plane, and dropped down to fifty meters.”

FIR: “Radio silence was absolute until Canning’s quiet “Eleven O’clock” announced contact with the enemy. The timing resulting from Major Mitchell’s close control of the flight’s speed and unwavering formation maintained was so exact that the enemy was met on the minute, where a few minutes’ delay would have meant complete failure.

The Lightnings were at 30 feet, heading in toward the (Bougainville) coast and (were) just about to begin to get their altitude for the presumed attack. The enemy was sighted, in a ‘V’, about 3 miles distant proceeding down the Southern coast toward Kihili (sic). The Two (sic) bombers were together, flying at 4500 feet, with two sections – 3 Zeros each – 1500 feet above them and slightly to the rear. As the enemy force, apparently unaware of enemy opposition, pursued his course, Mitchell led the covering group (twelve Lightnings) in their climb for altitude, ultimately reaching 15-18000 feet, from which point they stood their protecting vigil. Lanphier led his force parallel to the course of the enemy, flying into them a bit, and indicating 200 MPH, in his 35° climb. The P-38’s actually climbed at 2200 feet per minute. When level with the bombers, and about 2 miles away, Lanphier and Barber dropped their belly tanks and swung in to the attack at 280 MPH indicated. Holmes had difficulty in releasing his tank(s), and Hine remained with him until he could do so.

When Lanphier and Barber were within one mile of contact, their attack was observed by the enemy. The bombers nosed down, one started a 360° turn dive, the other going out and away toward the shoreline (south-southwest of the original course); The Zeros dropped their belly and three peeled down, in a string to intercept Lanphier.”

Ugaki: “’What happened?’ we all thought. (I) called out, ‘What happened?’ to the plane’s captain, an Air Chief Warrant Officer who was in the aisle. He replied ‘(It must have been some mistake.’ Such a remark proved (our actions to have been) a big mistake, (an) extreme stupidity. Because by this time, the fighter planes covering us, having already detected a group of twenty-four (sic) enemy fighter planes flying southward and then reversing course, made a warning dive toward our medium attack planes. At the same time, No. 1 plane [323] (had) also detected the enemy planes and it dived without any time to spare and skimmed over the jungle treetops. So, it was learned later.

At this time, the crew took up battle stations for the first time cleared their guns and prepared for firing. For a moment, the wind blowing in and the handling of machine guns and all caused one mixed, disturbing noise. When (our) plane began to drop altitude, an air battle had already developed with our escort fighter planes. The enemy, outnumbering us by four times, closed in mercilessly on the big target, our medium (sized) attack plane.”

N.B. Ugaki then explains the action of his bomber [326], described in the Fighter Interception Report as “one (bomber) started a 360° turn dive” while “the other [323] going out and away toward the shoreline” as follows:

Ugaki: “To counter this enemy move, (our) plane [326] made a sudden evasion turn of more than 90 degrees. The plane’s captain, his eyes glued to the sky and seeing an enemy plane about to make dive at us, tapped the shoulder of the chief pilot directing him to turn left or right. No. 1 [323] and No.2 planes [326] (had) then separated, No. 1 plane [323] going toward the right (FIR: “toward the shoreline” or south-southwest) and No 2 [326] toward the left (east); the distance between them increased.”

FIR: “Barber had gone in with Lanphier on the initial attack. He went for one of the bombers but its maneuvers caused him to overshoot a little. He whipped back (N.B. banking and side-slipping), however, and although pursued by Zeros, caught the bomber and destroyed it (Italics added). When he fired, the tail section flew off, the bomber (then) turned over on its back and plummeted to the earth.”

N.B. All subsequent accounts agree that Lanphier (on the left side of the attacking element) had initially made a climbing turn to the left (north by northwest). In so doing, he had gone nose to nose with three escorting Zeros on the seaward side of the formation. Barber, again by all accounts, had banked hard right, attacking one of the Bettys from the rear. This Betty [323], carrying Yamamoto, was erroneously reported in the Fighter Interception Report as having lost its tail and turning “over on its back” from the Barber attack. Nevertheless, the autopsy report on Yamamoto’s body reveals that Barber’s bullets, or shrapnel from Barber’s fusillade, fired from the Betty’s six o’clock position, had struck home. Yamamoto, seated on the starboard side of the cabin behind the pilot and facing forward, had been mortally wounded.

Agawa: “Yamamoto’s body (suffered) wounds about the size of the tip of one’s little finger where a machine-gun bullet had entered at the angle of the left lower jaw and emerged at the right, and an entry wound the size of the tip of one’s index finger in the center of the left shoulder blade. The latter hole went upward and to the right, but there was no exit wound.”

Ugaki: “After making about two evasion moves, (I) worried about No. 1 [323] plane, looked toward the right. “ Oh God!” (I) saw No. 1 plane, at a distance of about 4,000 meters, belching smoke, skimming the jungle top, speed dropping, heading south. ‘All’s lost’ was about all one could think of. (I) pulled toward me the shoulder of Air Staff Officer Muroi, who was standing in the aisle diagonally behind me, and ordered to him ‘Look at CinC’s plane’. It was the last farewell between them and us. All of this took only about 20 seconds to happen. (Italics added)

N.B. As previously noted, at the point Barber had banked right to approach the enemy bomber formation from the rear, Lanphier had turned left into the attacking Zero escort element.

FIR: “When he (Lanphier) saw he could not reach the bomber he turned up into the Zeros, exploding the first, and firing into the others as they passed. By this time he (Lanphier) had reached 6000 feet, so he nosed over, and went down to the tree tops after his escaping objective.”

Ugaki: “With the enemy upon us (our) plane [326] again made a sharp turn and lost sight of CinC’s plane.”

FIR: “He (Lanphier) came into it broadside – fired his bursts – a wing flew off (sic) and the plane went flaming to the earth.”

N.B. This one sentence in the official Fighter Interception Report has proven to be the most contentious. Lanphier later elaborated on this portion of the official report and, in future retelling of the events, always maintained that he had used a 90° deflection to bring down this bomber. It is very likely that Lanphier had made an attempt on the Ugaki bomber as it too, turned back to the south-southwest toward the shoreline. Pursued by Zeros, Barber had earlier used the same tract toward the shoreline and the open water. It is pure speculation, but very likely, that it was at this point in the engagement that Lanphier witnessed the crash of the Betty carrying Yamamoto. Lanphier would always maintain that he deserved credit for a bomber which crashed in the jungles of Bougainville. According to the official report, using the testimony of Lanphier and Barber, two Bettys had apparently crashed on Bougainville and each pilot had been given such credit! Today, based on the physical evidence of the wreckage found in the jungle, as well as the Japanese records, we know beyond all doubt that only one of the two bombers carrying the Combined Fleet staff crashed on land.

Ugaki: “Impatiently (I) waited for (our) plane to level off; (my) mind filled with anxiety on what (had) transpired. Although (the) outcome could be forseen, (my) next look found no sight of No. 1 plane [323], all that met (my) eye was black smoke rising above (the) jungle. Ah! It was finished!”

N.B. After Lanphier witnessed the crash of the bomber in the jungle, he made a low-level escape toward the south-southeast with Zeros in hot pursuit, eventually escaping to return alone to Fighter 2. After Barber’s attack on the Betty inland, as previously recounted, he made a wide swing toward the south-southeast, across the shoreline, and over the water along the southern Bougainville coast. Holmes had succeeded in shaking the troublesome belly tanks and, along with Hine, turned back toward the north-northeast. Holmes spied the Ugaki bomber, coming their way over the shoreline in a southerly direction. Holmes and Hine began a rear attack on this bomber. Barber, observing this action swung in behind Holmes and Hine. The combined attacks of Holmes, Hine, and Barber resulted in the crash and destruction of the Ugaki bomber just off-shore of Moila Point. The Zeros hotly contested these attacks. In the process, Barber and Holmes made claims for victories over three more Zeros. Unfortunately, Ray Hine took hits from a Zero and was last observed low over the water southwest of the Shortland Islands. Hine was the only loss among Mitchell’s force. Barber suffered numerous strikes and Holmes was forced to make an emergency landing in the Russell Islands when he nearly ran out of gas. Doug Canning, who had escorted Holmes on his return flight was the last of Mitchell’s interception force to land at Fighter 2.

When Lanphier landed, by all accounts, he began to proudly proclaim his victory over Admiral Yamamoto in spite of the fact that no one on the mission had any definite knowledge, or confirmation, of the Japanese Admiral’s death. Neither did anyone know at the time, with any degree of certainty, which of the bombers had been transporting Yamamoto! At the time the official Fighter Interception Report was written, both Barber’s and Lanphier’s claims for two bombers over the jungle had been confirmed! All were agreed that another Betty, carrying Ugaki, had been brought down over the water south of Moila Point. In order to account for the discrepancy within the report regarding the interception of two Betty bombers but the destruction of three bombers, the Betty carrying Ugaki was described as a stray bomber which just happened to be in the area! The seeds for the future controversy had been sown!

[dragon53]

Thanks for the info. Several years ago I read a then-current book on the Yamamoto downing and there was an AIR & SPACE SMITHSONIAN article about 8-10 years ago---both indicated the evidence supported Barber's claim that he shot down Yamamoto.

Here is part of a quote from Wikipedia on Barber:
"In 2003, however, Barber was officially credited with the sole kill after an inspection analyzed the crash site and determined the path of the bullet impacts, thereby validating Barber's account and invalidating Lanphier's claim."

Admittedly, Wikipedia is not a defintive source, but I was wondering if Barber had been given official credit since I last read up on the subject. I couldn't find that Barber had been given official full credit in other sources, so I assume Wikipedia's info is incorrect.

[Jim Lansdale]

Hi Dragon 53

Wikepedia is correct ... up to a point. Actually it was the American Fighter Aces Association which voted to accept Rex BARBER's claim for sole credit to the YAMAMOTO Betty kill. The official USAF postion was and remains that Tom LANPHIER and Rex BARBER were entitled to the 1/2 credit each for this particular Betty.

In spite of repeated court suits and an appeal to the USAF Credit Revue Board/Correction of Records Board by another ace, George CHANDLER, the "official" stand has never waivered! Forensic examination of the crash site by Charle DARBY, showed all bullet strikes to have been from the rear and the autopsy report of Admiral YAMAMOTO, also showed the two bullet entry wounds from the rear. This evidence seems to negate the claim by LANPHIER who, by his own statement, made his kill using a 90o deflection shot from the starboard beam of the Betty.

The earlier BARBER attack on the same Betty [323] was made from astern! The USAF Credit Revue Board considered both reports by both pilots credible to their claim for this kill, hence they awarded the 1/2 kill to each!!

Today, additional physical evidence seems to show that LANPHIER made a beam attack on the second Betty bomber [326] and passed behind it while its tail gunner continued to fire at LANPHIER. At this juncture, LANPHIER "witnessed" the YAMAMOTO Betty crash in the distance ahead of him.

LANPHIER always remained convinced he had downed the Betty he saw crash on land. This mixup resulted in the original official mission report, when written on 18 April 1943, having included the destruction of "three Bettys," not the two actuallyconfirmed to having been lost!!!
























FWIW.

Jim Lansdale,
Historian, 347th Fighter Group Association

[lanslide]

Hey - welcome to the forum dad! (lanslide senior)

[Ara1]

Ditto: welcome Mr. Lansdale. I last greeted you on the Japanese Aircraft site and have long appreciated your contributions to historical aviation. And your son's a swell guy too...

[Jim Lansdale]

Thank you Ara1 and Lanslide!

Jim Lansdale

[Captain Eddie]

Welcome to our humble Forum, Mr. Landsdale. It's great to have a man of your knowledge on board.

[Jim Lansdale]

The BARBER vs LANPHIER Betty Kill Controversy

(c) James F. Lansdale

It was all over in less than five minutes. One Betty, carrying AdmiralYamamoto, had crashed and burned in the jungles of Bougainville near the village of Aku. Another Betty, with Admiral Ugaki aboard, had crashed in the sea off Moila Point and several of the escorting Zeros were believed to have been shot-down. Major Mitchell radioed, "Mission accomplished!" and ordered everyone home. Lanphier and Barber, separated during the melee, individually made their way back. Lanphier had two strikes on his tail. Barber's "Miss Virginia" was worse for the wear with over a hundred holes and the inner cooler for one of the engine turbo superchargers out of service. Holmes was alone after last seeing Ray Hine southwest of Shortland Island. Hine was trailing smoke or vapor from the left engine and heading in the general direction of Wilson Strait. Tragically, Hine was never seen again by his squadron mates.

Almost in a panic, Holmes radioed for help and managed to team up with the last man to leave the area, Doug Canning. Canning led the pair back toward Fighter 2. Holmes was short on fuel, so Canning dragged an uncompleted airfield in the Russells and pointed the way for Holmes to make an emergency landing. Canning, ironically, had been the first to spot Admiral Yamamoto's flight and he was the last to leave the combat area. In his own words, he was the quintessential tourist and he had maximized this trip!

Lanphier was the first of the attack section to return to Fighter 2 and excitedly announced his victories. Roger Ames recalled, "I can (still) remember how upset I was when Tom Lanphier made his statement over the open mike." According to the Guadalcanal approach control director on duty the day of the mission, Lt. (jg) Edward C. Hutcheson, USNR, Lanphier announced over the radio, "I got Yamamoto! ... He won't dictate peace terms in the White House now!" Others also recalled Lanphier's repeated statements claiming the Betty carrying Admiral Yamamoto. Barber, returning to base after Lanphier, also overheard Lanphier's victory statements and, with some vexation, asked, "How in the hell do you know you got Yamamoto?" Then, according to Barber, Lanphier called Barber a "damn liar!" Barber was surprised at Lanphier's response. Said Barber; "I hadn't made a statement. I just asked a question, but he was calling me a 'damn liar' for asking a question."

When Holmes returned to Fighter 2 from his stop in the Russells, he discovered that the awards for the destruction of both Betty bombers had been given to Barber and Lanphier. Holmes was furious! However, by the time the official report of the mission had been written, all three surviving pilots were credited with equal victories. Each had received credit for one Betty and one Zero. In addition, Ray Hine was also credited with a Zero kill. From all the documentary evidence now available, from both Japanese and American sources the only Japanese losses for the day in the Buin-Ballale area were the two Betty bombers transporting the Combined Fleet staff. No Zeros had been destroyed. The official kill credits contained in the Fighter Interception Report appeared to mollify the pilots in the attack section and, at that time, any acrimony over the kill awards appears to have abated.

A few days after the mission, Barber, Lanphier, and Brig. Gen. "Doc" Strother, were given ten days R & R and they flew to Auckland, New Zealand. During this time, the men played many rounds of golf with the senior AP war correspondent, J. Norman Lodge. Lodge was able to use this time to interview the men regarding details of the Yamamoto Mission. Barber and Strother were under the impression that Lodge knew most of what had happened from other sources and they did not regard his questions as being more than a need to elaborate on some of the details. When Lodge submitted his story of the Yamamoto Mission to the U.S. naval censors for clearance, the original made its way to Admiral Halsey. Halsey was enraged at the obvious breakdown of the secrecy with which the Navy had regarded this mission. Particularly, there was great fear that the Japanese would discover that Naval Intelligence was reading the most secret and sensitive Japanese ciphers.

Admiral Halsey called the three men to a conference in which he dressed them down for having revealed such top-secret information to a correspondent. Further, Halsey withdrew the Navy's recommendation for the Medal of Honor for the mission participants and downgraded the award to the Navy Cross. He also ordered Rear Admiral Mitscher (COMAIRSOL) to conduct a complete investigation of the affair. Admiral Mitscher's report stated that, according to Capt. William Morrison, AAF, only one reference had been made in public regarding the identity of Admiral Yamamoto as the target of the mission. Morrison testified that "a remark, believed to have come from Capt. Lanphier" had been made; "That son of a bitch won't dictate any peace terms in the White House." Mitscher, in his conclusion to Halsey, wrote, "No evidence has been unearthed which would indicate that any information concerning this strike was passed to newspapermen directly or indirectly." By this time, however, scores of individuals had learned of the "top-secret" mission and, most regretfully, Barber and Lanphier had indeed confirmed to Lodge the details of his story. Lodge's account was also stamped as "top secret", but it became one of the major components in the grist of future controversy.

During the succeeding years, other articles and books were written regarding the Yamamoto Mission. With each story telling, the flames of discord between the participants grew. In 1984, an organization was formed to study and document the details as well as the controversial issues surrounding the Yamamoto Mission. The "Second Yamamoto Mission Association" (SYMA) was founded and led by George T. Chandler, a 339th Fighter Squadron veteran and ace. Chandler believed that a great historical injustice had been perpetrated against a fellow pilot and friend, Rex Barber. SYMA gathered a group of veterans, forensic experts, and historians. Their task became focused on every detail of what factually occurred on 18 April 1943 over Bougainville and on the myriad aspects of the victory award controversy. The following material recounts all of the major events surrounding the controversy as chronicled by SYMA and is presented herewith by permission of SYMA and its president.

Introduction to the Second Yamamoto Mission Summary

There are numerous inconsistencies in the way that the history of the Yamamoto mission has been developed. This (summary) seeks to provide the framework for independent analysis leading to a correction of the record and providing Colonel (ret) Rex Barber the credit that he is due.

*****

What follows is a condensed account of what has transpired in the effort to get the records in the Office of Air Force History (OAFH) corrected to accurately reflect how Yamamoto was shot down and by whom.

1. When the pilots returned to Guadalcanal from the fight over Bougainville, there was a lot of talk and some argument over what had happened, but there was no careful debriefing with individual pilots separated and debriefed by intelligence officers.

2. Rex Barber said that he attacked a bomber, shot pieces off of the tail, shot into the right engine and then through the fuselage and into the left engine and back into the right engine, following it down to the treetops. The bomber slowed abruptly and Barber swerved to miss it and, looking back, saw a pillar of smoke from the jungle and the escorting Zeros attacking him. With good luck and very skillful flying he got away from the Zeros and out over the water and saw a Betty bomber under attack by two P-38s (Besby Holmes and Ray Hine). Barber joined in the attack and the bomber exploded from his gunfire and he flew through the pieces of the bomber, resulting in substantial damage to his airplane from hitting different pieces.

3. In later statements, Tom Lanphier said that after he first turned left and up to meet the diving Zeros in a head-on pass that he shot the wing off of the lead Zero and zoomed up to 5,500 feet, rolled over on his back and looked down and saw a bomber that had apparently made a 360 degree turn and so he dove down and attacked that bomber and shot the wing off it and it crashed in the jungle. At the Nimitz Yamamoto Retrospective in April 1988, surviving Zero pilot Kenji Yanagiya, stated emphatically that all 6 of the Zeros escorting the bombers returned to Rabaul and he knew each one of the pilots and not one of them was shot down. Japanese records confirmed that not one of the 6 escorting Zeros was lost. Yanagiya also stated that the Admiral's aircraft never made a turn but flew straight towards Buin until it went down in the jungle.

4. John Mitchell, the mission leader, told George Chandler on a number of subsequent occasions that there was no formal debriefing of the pilots when they returned from the Yamamoto mission. The pilots gathered and talked a great deal about the mission but there was never a formal debriefing by intelligence officers. A full copy of the Yamamoto Mission Report is attached and it has in handwriting the words "Morrison & McGuigan". Early in SYMA's investigation, Rex Barber told George Chandler that the morning after the Yamamoto mission was flown, Tom Lanphier sat down beside Rex and told him that he, Tom Lanphier, had gone to the Navy intelligence office and had written the entire mission report for the intelligence officers. None of the reports, out of all of the combat reports of actions by USAAF fighters in air battles in the Solomons for a few months prior to the Yamamoto mission, has anything like the explanation in detail that is written up in the combat report about the Yamamoto mission.

5. The squadron records showed one full credit for a bomber shot down by Rex Barber; one full credit for a bomber shot down by Lanphier; a half credit each to Barber and Holmes for the one bomber shot down over the water.

6. At the time of the mission report writing, no one had any way of knowing which bomber Admiral Yamamoto was riding in.

7. Because the interception had been made on the basis of intelligence information of Yamamoto's plans that came from our intelligence people having broken the Japanese naval code, it was of utmost importance that the Japanese not figure out that their code had been broken. So, this mission was not publicized and it appears that references in the official records were minimized.

8. After the war, Tom Lanphier wrote numerous articles about the mission and claimed that he had shot down the bomber carrying Yamamoto. These articles, written in the same flowery manner as the "mission report", have been provided repeatedly to OAFH, and make clear Lanphier's claim to have shot down Yamamoto, alone and unassisted.

9. In 1969, the original recount on World War II aerial victory credits was begun under the supervision of Dr. Maurer, then Chief of the Historical Studies Branch. The branch was examining Japanese records as well as American records. Notes from 1969 by Dr. Maurer explain that the credit for the Yamamoto bomber was split between Barber and Lanphier when he and his staff discovered that only one bomber went down in the Bougainville jungle.
Subsequent evidence confirmed that there were only two Betty bombers in the Yamamoto flight. Cards prepared for USAF Historical Study #85, "USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft, World War II", seem to be all that is left of the "working papers". Two cards for Lanphier and Barber dated 18 April 1943 suggest that a 1.00 on each card was changed to .50. Apparently, Lanphier and Barber were each given credit for shooting down a bomber over Bougainville, but the credit was split. USAF Historical Study #85 actually appeared in 1978 although the cards for Lanphier and Barber were changed in 1969 when the study was still being compiled.

10. Lanphier objected to the change giving him only half credit for the shoot down of the Yamamoto bomber. He persuaded Brigadier General Michael J. Jackson, USAF, Ret, to petition Dr. Richard H. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History, to have a determination made by the Office of Air Force History that Lanphier should have 100% of the credit for the shoot down of Yamamoto.

11. Dr. Kohn created a Victory Credit Board (VCB) of Review at the USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL, to reconsider the awarding of victory credits for the destruction of Admiral Yamamoto's airplane on 18 April 1943. This Victory Credit Board of Review met on 22 March 1985 with Mr. R. Cargill Hall, Chief, Research Division, Office of Air Force History, as the Recorder. There were 3 different versions of the Record of Proceedings as furnished by R. Cargill Hall, which are referenced. While all of the Records of Proceedings are similar in their description of the engagement, the reader should pay attention to how the Bibliography of Reference, considered by the VCB, increased as successive Records of Proceedings were written by R. Cargill Hall.

The conclusion reached by the VCB of Review includes these significant paragraphs:

"The evidence points to 1st Lt. Barber as the first to fire on Admiral Yamamoto's lead bomber, setting it afire and causing a portion of the tail empennage to fly off. But the burning bomber, in the words of Admiral Ugaki, continued to fly under power just above the jungle, losing altitude. Barber's wingman, Captain Lanphier, once disengaged from the Zeros, next struck Yamamoto's bomber broadside, severing a wing. The bomber turned over on its back and plummeted to earth. Barber, on looking back after his pass, saw the airplane fall and understandably presumed it to be the result of his attack.
During the heat of ensuing dogfights, 1st Lt. Holmes observed Admiral Ugaki's Betty proceeding southeasterly near Moila Point. Holmes attacked the second bomber "setting it smoking in the left engine." Barber "polished it off," pieces of the bomber exploding outward from the impact of the 20mm cannon shells, some of them striking his fighter. Admiral Ugaki's bomber, however, did not explode in the air as Barber supposed, but rather dove out of control into the sea.
Based on the guidelines established by XIII Fighter Command for the awarding of victory credits, credit for the destruction of both bombers is properly shared; the findings of the original USAF Historical Division victory credit team are judged to be accurate and confirmed; the official USAF shared credits will remain unaltered for this engagement."

12. Neither pilot had either a gun camera or independent observer confirmation of what they said they did that day as was required under 13th Air Force regulations for aerial victory credits, although Lanphier's statements repeatedly confirm that he observed Barber shoot a bomber down over the jungle.

13. At the 1988 Yamamoto Retrospective in Fredericksburg, TX, George Chandler asked Cargill Hall if the Office of Air Force History had made any efforts to examine the wreckage of the Yamamoto bomber? It seemed that physical evidence would prove or disprove the inconsistent statements made by the two pilots, i.e., Barber and Lanphier. If the right wing had not been shot off in flight, it would conclusively prove that Lanphier did not attack the Yamamoto airplane.
Cargill Hall responded saying that there had been no effort by the Office of Air Force History to examine the wreckage and it would be too expensive to do so. George Chandler told him that it would look like a very easy mission for a crash investigating team to fly from Clark Field in the Philippines to the commercial airport in Bougainville and there take a helicopter from the mining company and go in to the wreckage and they could then prove what happened or did not happen. Chandler then asked Cargill Hall the direct question, "If I take a team, including a qualified crash investigating engineer, to the wreckage site in Bougainville, will you convene a new Victory Credit Board to review the evidence that we bring?" Cargill Hall declined to respond to that question. At that moment, Hall knew that both wings were still attached to the Yamamoto bomber as it entered the jungle and that the left wing was torn off by impact with a tree and the right wing was immediately adjacent to the fuselage and right engine.

R. Cargill Hall, as Chief of Research for the Office of Air Force History, was professionally dishonest when he did not share with Chandler that he and Dr. Kohn already knew that neither wing of the Yamamoto bomber had been shot off in flight. Of course, it would have been unfair to let SYMA make an expensive trip to the Bougainville jungle to find information that he already knew. But even more damning is the fact that he knew the Yamamoto bomber did not have a wing shot off and thus he knew that Lanphier could not have attacked the Yamamoto bomber. His only possible motive was that he and Dr. Kohn were determined to preserve the half credit to each pilot, no matter what the physical evidence proved.

Was there pressure being brought to bear on Dr. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History, and R. Cargill Hall, Chief, Research Division, Office of Air Force History, that they should not do any thing to change the half credit to each pilot? Or, did they make that decision themselves and stonewall all of the efforts and display of facts by SYMA to prove that Lanphier did not attack the Yamamoto airplane?

14. A group of pilots from the 339th Fighter Squadron, together with a number of interested fellows like Joe Pruett, and his friends in the VFW in Kansas City, decided to form a 501(C)(3) corporation to accept contributions and make a trip to the jungle and examine the wreckage and bring detailed information back to the Office of Air Force History. The charter for the Second Yamamoto Mission Association (SYMA) was recorded 29 December 1988.

15. Mr. Al Kauslick was an engineer with the copper mine on Bougainville and interestingly he was a personal friend of Tom Lanphier. Al Kauslick told SYMA that he could get the company helicopter to take a party into the jungle and save a full day of walking through the jungle trail. The team was formed and was ready to go when the Civil War in Bougainville broke out and the team could not get visas.

16. SYMA then started exchanging correspondence with Dr. Richard Kohn, Chief, OAFH, and Cargill Hall. Eugene Monihan and George Chandler made a trip to Washington and met with Dr. Kohn and Cargill Hall. They were assured verbally and in Dr. Kohn's letter of 7 December 1988 and his letter of 17 January 1989 that if credible new evidence was provided , he would convene a new Victory Credit Board of Review. In his letter of 22 March 1989, Dr. Kohn mentioned that in late 1987, after Cargill Hall received an invitation to chair the Survivor's Panel at the Yamamoto Retrospective, and when he discerned that the victory credit issue remained one of keen interest, he endeavored to gather all current information - - including pictures of the aircraft wreckage. In early 1988, he showed pictures of the aircraft wreckage to an aeronautical engineer who advised that the wing that fell 150 feet behind the aircraft was the outer left wing, damaged on the leading edge on impact with the trees, showing its spars bent backwards. (Had the wing separated in flight, the spars would have been bent upwards.) The right wing outer panel lay where that wing burned with the wreckage; apparently it did not detach in flight. Why did this information not cause Dr. Kohn to re-examine the report of the Victory Credit Board of Review?

17. SYMA went to great effort to develop evidence from records other than what was in the Bougainville jungle.

17.1 At SYMA's request, the famed P-38 pilot, Lefty Gardner, flew his P-38 and duplicated the maneuvers that Lanphier said he had performed. Lefty Gardner concluded that it was impossible for Lanphier to have done what he said he did in zooming up into the attacking Zeros and then roll over on his back and dive down and attack a bomber in the time between his left upward turn and when the Yamamoto plane was down in the jungle.

17.2 A sworn affidavit from Kenji Yanagiya says, "I saw one P-38 firing into the tail of Admiral Yamamoto's bomber and I saw the Admiral's airplane emitting smoke and flames while one P-38 was directly behind it. I saw the Admiral's airplane descend toward the jungle in an attitude of forced landing within 20 to 30 seconds (emphasis added) from when I first saw one P-38 behind the Admiral's airplane firing into it. From the time that I first sighted any of the P-38s until the Admiral's airplane was down in the jungle was two minutes or less".

17.3 Yanagiya said that the Yamamoto bomber proceeded on a straight course towards Buin so a calculation of Lanphier's overtaking speed showed conclusively that he had not overtaken the Yamamoto airplane in the 20 - 30 seconds before it was in the jungle as set forth by Yanagiya. It is interesting that Yanagiya also said that it was only approximately two minutes from the time they first saw the P-38s until the Admiral was down in the jungle. Dr. Richard Kohn later manipulated Yanagiya's statements where Yanagiya said that from the time he first saw an attack on the Admiral's airplane until it was down in the jungle was about 20 seconds; he further stated that from the time they first saw the P-38s until the Admiral's plane was down in the jungle was about two minutes. Dr. Kohn, in his attempt to show that there was time for Lanphier to overtake Yamamoto's bomber after Lanphier zoomed up into the Zeros, manipulates the two minutes from first sighting to indicate that there was two minutes for pursuit by Lanphier. This was one of the reasons given by Dr. Kohn for refusing to convene a new Victory Credit Board of Review and let SYMA present the new evidence that it had accumulated.

18. SYMA, representing Rex Barber, next petitioned the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR) for a formal hearing and an opportunity to present all of the evidence that SYMA had put together. The hearing was held 17-18 October 1991 in Washington, DC. C. Bruce Braswell, Executive Director, AFBCMR, later said that the presentation made by attorney Darrell Kellogg was the best presentation to a Board that he had ever seen.

19. The Air Force Board consisted of Leroy T. Baseman, Chairman, John W. Beach, Herbert H. Kaiser, Ira Kemp and Dr. Sydell P. Gold. No member of the Board was a pilot or had aviation training or expert knowledge.

20. Chairman Leroy T. Baseman explained to all of those in attendance, i.e., John Mitchell, Rex Barber, Bob Radcliff, George Chandler and Bill Wisecarver that the Board would consider every piece of evidence and make a determination of how the Board regarded that evidence, i.e., unanimous, accepted or rejected; if not unanimous, who voted yeah or nay and the reasons for their vote and that everyone would have to vote. The AFBCMR would make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force. The Secretary of the Air Force was not bound by the recommendation and could make any decision that he felt warranted. This was set forth under the law that created the Boards for Correction of Military Records of the different services.

21. Apparently Dr. Kohn was concerned the AFBCMR would make a finding different from what had been the position of the OAFH under his administration. He wrote an article that was published in the spring 1992 issue of Air Power History. Was he was making an effort to influence the Board? SYMA thought so and objected and asked Senator Bob Dole to call it to the attention of the Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice. The following is the exchange of correspondence between Senator Dole and Secretary Rice:

"March 24, 1992

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to express my concern about a recent article that the former Chief of Air Force History, Dr. Richard Kohn, published in the Spring, 1992, issue of Air Power History.

Dr. Kohn's article gives his personal views of the shoot down of Japanese Admiral Yamamoto in April 1943. Although not present at the Air Force Board of the Correction of Military Records hearing in October 1991, Dr. Kohn dismisses the substantial evidence presented to the Board and disregards the testimony of two eye witnesses and over 200 pages of documents.

As the Board is still in deliberation on this matter, I believe Dr. Kohn's timing of this article is extremely unfortunate and may appear as an attempt to influence the Board. I hope that you will ensure that the Board's decision rests on the preponderance of evidence and not external personal views that are contrary to the testimony, documentation and exhaustive investigation that was given in regard to this controversy.

Sincerely,
Bob Dole

United States Senate"

"March 31, 1992

Dear Senator Dole:

Thank you for your letter concerning Dr. Richard Kohn's article in Air Power History.

I agree that the timing of this article is unfortunate but can assure you the article will not be considered in the deliberations of the Correction Board. The Executive Director of the Board has been in touch with Mr. Bill Wisecarver of your staff and Mr. George Chandler to confirm that Dr. Kohn is no longer the Air Force Historian and is not privy to the Board deliberations. There has been absolutely no ex parte contact between Board members, or Board staff, and Dr. Kohn, nor will there be. Only the evidence of record will be considered by the Board in their deliberations.(emphasis added)

I appreciate your patience with this case and will inform you as soon as a decisi