[Gort]

Can wars be won from the air?

Good question. Proponents argue that B-29s defeated the Japanese with a devastating one-two nuclear punch. And they site the 1972 B-52 Linebacker bombing campaign as the prime factor in forcing the North Vietnamese to the negotiation table and eventually ending the war.

Almost since the dawn of military air power, strategists have promoted the bombing of “strategic” targets such as infrastructure and transportation hubs to inflict such pain on a population that it would turn against its leaders and get them to surrender or compromise.

Conversely, ground-pounder advocates argue that strategic bombing has almost never worked. Far from bringing about the intended softening of the opposition, bombing tends to rally people behind their own leaders and cause them to dig in against outsiders who, whatever the justification, are destroying their homeland. They maintain that methodically seizing and holding ground consummates victory.

Who’s right?

[flyXwire]

Great post, Gort! I thought we already demonstrated this during Operation Desert Storm?

[Berkut76]

Depends on the political objectives and willingness to go barbaric on your opponent.

With our opponents building their military infrastructure smack down in the middle of urban populated areas, the limited use of airforce (i.e. pinpoint strikes on vehicles and only if we are absolutely sure) couldn't tip the balance in the conflict.

On the other hand, absolutely brutal application of overwhelming fire superiority through concentrated area-based artillery and air strikes could make fighting substantially easier for ground troops as demonstrated in WWII and most recently in the Second Chechnya war.

So, while you can't win war through air power alone, you can substantially minimize one's casualties on the ground by its determined use.

Regards,

Sergey

[bsmith13]

It depends on the type of war, and (as Berkut said) how far the political leaders are willing to go in employing air power to gain victory.

"...strategists have promoted the bombing of 'strategic' targets such as infrastructure and transportation hubs to inflict such pain on a population that it would turn against its leaders and get them to surrender or compromise."

This sentence should really be divided into two parts: The bombing of infrastructure/transportation and the indiscriminate bombing of the population.

Most world air powers stopped believing that aerial bombing could incite the civilian population to sue for peace after WWII. The population of Britain and Germany both proved that bombing, indiscriminate or otherwise, could be endured if necessary.

The bombing of infrastructure/transporation targets has evolved a great deal since WWII. Precision Guided Munitions have completely changed how targets are prosecuted. As Air Force pundits are fond of saying, it is no longer a matter of how many planes per target, but how many targets can be attacked per plane.

In a full-up conventional war, "centers of gravity" are identified and targeted. Centers of Gravity are targets that will greatly reduce or eliminate the enemy's ability to fight. Power production, POL, communcations centers, HQ and command centers, etc are good examples of Centers of Gravity (this list is not inclusive, as part of the effectiveness of air power is determined by the effectiveness of the targeteers on a battle staff in determining what the actual CoGs are.) During Desert Storm, this theory was successfully proven. During the Balkan Crisis, air power was deployed piece-meal by european political leaders who where unable or unwilling to allow identified CoGs to be attacked. In a guerilla or insurgent war, air power is relegated to a support role, as both of these are very much a "hearts and minds" type of conflict.

If you define the spectrum of warfare on a scale from Conventional to Unconventional, I would argue that the effectiveness of air power in winning a war depends on where you are on the scale. Airpower is devastatingly effective on the Conventional end, and merely an enabler or force-multiplier on the Unconventional side. The effectiveness of airpower can be degraded further by weak political will or poor targeteering.

[Hoverbug]

Originally Posted by Gort

Can wars be won from the air?

Good question. Proponents argue that B-29s defeated the Japanese with a devastating one-two nuclear punch. And they site the 1972 B-52 Linebacker bombing campaign as the prime factor in forcing the North Vietnamese to the negotiation table and eventually ending the war.

Almost since the dawn of military air power, strategists have promoted the bombing of “strategic” targets such as infrastructure and transportation hubs to inflict such pain on a population that it would turn against its leaders and get them to surrender or compromise.

Conversely, ground-pounder advocates argue that strategic bombing has almost never worked. Far from bringing about the intended softening of the opposition, bombing tends to rally people behind their own leaders and cause them to dig in against outsiders who, whatever the justification, are destroying their homeland. They maintain that methodically seizing and holding ground consummates victory.

Who’s right?

The answer would seem to be whether or not the assets that the hostile nation/agents use to maintain power can be practically targeted. In WWII, Germany had POL and transportation infrastructure that made air power an effective tool. Japan was an even better case study as the limited internal road and rail networks made coastal shipping critical, so with aerial mining and other anti-shipping operations, Japan was brought to its knees once sufficient mass was available. The atomic bombs were useful for sapping the Japanese political will to fight, but conventional weapons had already insured that the response to an invasion of the home islands would likely have been an insurgent campaign rather than a coordinated military effort. Both Germany and Japan waged war on a western model of industrialized warfare. We run into problems with the use of airpower when we fight enemies that do not operate on this model. The enemy adapts by blending into the local population and airpower becomes far less useful.

[Shawn 507]

"You can shell a piece of ground. You can bomb it, or you can irradiate it, but you do not own it until you stand an eighteen year old with a rifle on top of it." Or words to that effect.
Kinda sums it up don't it?
- Shawn

[VMF115]

Originally Posted by Shawn 507

"You can shell a piece of ground. You can bomb it, or you can irradiate it, but you do not own it until you stand an eighteen year old with a rifle on top of it." Or words to that effect.
Kinda sums it up don't it?
- Shawn

I agree. Infantry rules!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

[Cardinal]

You can't necessarily win a war from the air but you can definitely lose it without control of the wide blue yonder .

[FormerViperDriver]

The war in Serbia/Kosovo (Operation Allied Force, 1999) was won in the air with almost no ground forces involved (minimal Kosovar rebel faction involvement). So you don't have to speculate. It has already happened.

Now, can it be done as a rule? No, in most cases you will need ground forces. But to say it just can't be done is dogmatic in the extreme, and disproven by facts.

FVD

[Shawn 507]

Ah yes the great Gen. Wes Clark adventure. Hasn't there been debate over his use of "Air Power" and the "real results". I've heard mention the bombing of tanks that were nothing more than mock ups with a heat source. And several other examples of fluff to support the claim he won it without spilling the blood of ground troops. And no, I'm not stirring the pot, these are topics that I've heard around the water cooler here at Ft. Benning.
- Shawn