[bsmith13]

Why did the British only bomb at night? Why did the US continue daylight bombing in the face of such massive casualties in 1943? These questions can't be answered in one sentence, or even one paragraph. Rather than hijack another thread, I am posting what I have learned through studying this topic in Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College.

After WWI, the military arms of many countries were trying to figure out how best to use a new weapon, the airplane. More than anyone else, Guilio Douhet shaped the thinking about strategic bombing in the interwar years. Douhet's theories on the use of airpower hypothesized that bombing an enemy's city would demoralize the civilian populace to the point where they would pressure their own leaders to end the war. Douhet had many adherents around the world, including Harris in Great Britian, and Mitchell, Spaatz and Arnold in the US. A school was formed at Maxwell Field in Alabama to study the implications of using airpower strategically. Though most of the students of this Advanced Tactical School (as it was called) still believed in many of the ideas of Douhet, the idea of Strategic Pinpoint Bombing of an enemy's war resources was born and fostered.

Another of Douhet's concepts was that "The Bomber will always get through". We now know this to be false, but those in power in the Luftwaffe, RAF, and USAAC all believed it. The Germans chose to design and pursue medium bombers that relied on speed (though if a key Luftwaffe leader hadn't been killed in 1936, the history of the war might have been different. But that's a different topic.) The Americans chose to design and build heavily armed bombers that could defend themselves. The British chose a mix of both design philosophies.

It is clear now in hindsight that the Germans never understood the strategic application of airpower. It is also clear now that the bomber will NOT always get through, but young men (on both sides) had to die in order to change that assumption. I will save the "Errors committed by Luftwaffe leadership" for another topic.

Early in World War II, RAF Bomber Command attempted many daylight raids in squadron strength against military and industrial targets. Some of these raids suffered 100% casualties; not a single plane returned. To the best of my knowledge, none of these raids were escorted by fighters. The British were finding out the hard way that the bomber didn't always get through. and the amount of airmen being killed in Bomber Command was so horrific that Air Marshall Harris changed tactics. Subscribing to Douhet's theory of bombing the enemy civilian populace into submission, RAF Bomber Command heavy bombers mainly took to the skies at night to begin the Strategic Area Bombing Campaign. The RAF still bombed during the day, but usually only with medium and light bombers. Starting in 1941, these raids were heavily escorted; sometimes two squadrons of bombers would be protected by 12 squadrons of fighters. The targets available to RAF day bombers was limited by the range of RAF fighters, so not many targets were hit outside France, Holland and Belgium before the invasion in 1944.

The Americans arrived on the scene in Britain in 1942. The first raid was a small one in July, with only one squadron of B-17s hitting and easy target in France. More men and material were to follow. The leaders who had attended ATS in Alabama were now in charge of the 8th Air Force, and the opinion of the Americans was that RAF daylight bombing had failed because their bombers didn't have enough guns to defend them from enemy interceptors. Spaatz and his staff began to look for single targets that, if bombed successfully, might cripple the German war effort. Some of the most promising (in American eyes) were ball-bearing plants and oil production facilities. If the Germany had no ball-bearings or fuel, they would not be able to run their military machinery. However, in order to knock them out of production, a high amount of explosive would have to be delivered on target, and that could only be done by daylight.

During 1943, VIII Bomber Command learned the hard way that the bomber did not always get through. B-17s and B-24s were suffering unsustainable casualties in an attempt to knock out the German War Machine.

So how did RAF and USAAF react to the revelation that the bomber did not always get through?

The RAF could see that the "Total War" doctrine of Harris that dictated bombing enemy cities was not having a huge effect, other than the propaganda benefit for their own population. Harris was originally against what he called "Panacea Targets," or targets that would win the war in one blow. However, since night time bombing was not producing the results he wanted, he was far more amenable to the idea of a "Sniper Squadron" in 1943 than he would have been in 1940. The result is that 617 Squadron was born, and the Dambuster raid took place. 617 Squadron pioneered the concepts of ultra accurate bombing that have dictated a great deal of the airpower doctine in use today, but that is another topic. Another concequence of the lack of night time results was the use of the pathfinder system and the british use of intersecting radio beams for more accurate bombing. (I think the system was called "Oboe", but I can't find it at the moment...)

In November of 1943, the Americans could see why the British had turned to night time bombing. There was no way that VIII Bomber Command could continue raids deep into Germany and continue losing the crews and airframes it had to this point. However, the Americans went a different direction - the escort fighter. The problem of escort fighters not having long enough legs to get the bombers to their targets was an old problem, and both the Americans and British had been chipping away at it since the beginning of the war. However, the staggering American losses over Germany imparted a sense of urgency to developing better long-range external fuel tanks, and ultimately, the development of the A-36 into the P-51 Mustang.

With the advent of the Mustang over Europe in December of 1943, American Daylight Bombing became tenable. 8th Air Force was able to hit their "Panacea" targets, not with impunity, but at least not with such horrible losses.

The result is that the Luftwaffe pulled their fighters into tighter interior "lines". By May of 1944, nearly all Luftwaffe fighters on the western front had been pulled closer to Germany in order to better react to USAAF bomber raids. In preparation to the invasion, Eisenhower got control of ALL of the allied air forces in Europe, and bombed continental rail transportation centers to rubble.

By the end of the war, German aircraft and AFV production was higher than it had ever been, invalidating the ball-bearing plants as targets. However, Germany was suffering a terrible fuel crisis, imposed by allied bombing of POL production centers. Neither the RAF nor the USAAF had won the war, nor had they forced the enemy to its knees in the manner which they had predicted, but the following facts are incontrovertible:

1. USAAF Strategic Bombing forced the Germans to react by pulling their day fighters closer to Germany. This, coupled with the all-out air campaign against transportation centers in May of 1944 meant that the Normandy invasion was virtually unopposed by the Luftwaffe.

2. USAAF Strategic Bombing crippled the German ability to wage war in a time and place of german choosing by limiting the amount of fuel they had available to fight with.

Here are some responses to questions posed in the "Droop Snoot" thread.

1. Light Bombers and Fighter Bombers, though useful (and in some quarters indispensible) were not capable of delivering the weight of explosive on targets to knock them out with the accuracy that was required at the time.
2. In war, young men die. Sometimes they die in order to disprove faulty strategic thinking. If the incorrect idea was finally thrown down and replaced with war-winning doctrine, then I personally do not believe that they died in vain.
3. B-17s could not carry the load that Lancasters or Liberators could. P-38s could not carry any where near the amount of bombs that a B-17 could all the way to Germany. If a P-38 formation had come under heavy fighter attack on the way to a target, they would jettison their bombs and fight - such an enemy move would defeat the raid.

If any of you had the willpower to slog all the way through this, good for you! I tend to believe that it will be ignored as another long dissertation from that boring Smith guy...

[admin]

Excellent read, good job Mr. Smith.

I enjoy long dissertations, they tend to be well thought out.

[flyXwire]

Excellent read and thanks. I thoroughly enjoyed it.

[Cardinal]

Another key consequence of the bombing raids was the fact that flak guns (especially the '88') that could have been used on the front lines were held back for AA defence duties of both cities and key industrial targets. Apparently, had these units been available for service in the ground war, Allied losses would most likely have been far higher than they were (especially on the Eastern Front).

[Hoverbug]

Originally Posted by Cardinal

Another key consequence of the bombing raids was the fact that flak guns (especially the '88') that could have been used on the front lines were held back for AA defence duties of both cities and key industrial targets. Apparently, had these units been available for service in the ground war, Allied losses would most likely have been far higher than they were (especially on the Eastern Front).

Keep in mind though, that many Flak units used personnel which were not suitable for ground combat - women, children, invalids, etc. The equipment might have been able to go, but they couldn't have been manned peoperly, plus factor in the cost in prime movers, fuel, rail capacity, etc. that Germany couldn't afford anyway. Of course, extensive use of heavy Flak guns in ground combat is a good indication you are on the defensive and already losing.

[Cardinal]

Originally Posted by Hoverbug

Keep in mind though, that many Flak units used personnel which were not suitable for ground combat - women, children, invalids, etc. The equipment might have been able to go, but they couldn't have been manned peoperly, plus factor in the cost in prime movers, fuel, rail capacity, etc. that Germany couldn't afford anyway. Of course, extensive use of heavy Flak guns in ground combat is a good indication you are on the defensive and already losing.

Very true, but I have read somewhere (?) that the Wehrmacht were desperately short of the actual hardware (Flak 36/37 aka '88') and would have found ways of manning them if they had been made available on the front lines. You're right though that logistically this would have been increasingly difficult in the latter stages of the war but it would have not been overly difficult circa. 1943.

[Hoverbug]

Originally Posted by bsmith13

Another of Douhet's concepts was that "The Bomber will always get through". We now know this to be false, but those in power in the Luftwaffe, RAF, and USAAC all believed it. The Germans chose to design and pursue medium bombers that relied on speed (though if a key Luftwaffe leader hadn't been killed in 1936, the history of the war might have been different. But that's a different topic.) The Americans chose to design and build heavily armed bombers that could defend themselves. The British chose a mix of both design philosophies.

It is clear now in hindsight that the Germans never understood the strategic application of airpower. It is also clear now that the bomber will NOT always get through, but young men (on both sides) had to die in order to change that assumption. I will save the "Errors committed by Luftwaffe leadership" for another topic.

Early in World War II, RAF Bomber Command attempted many daylight raids in squadron strength against military and industrial targets. Some of these raids suffered 100% casualties; not a single plane returned. To the best of my knowledge, none of these raids were escorted by fighters. The British were finding out the hard way that the bomber didn't always get through. and the amount of airmen being killed in Bomber Command was so horrific that Air Marshall Harris changed tactics. Subscribing to Douhet's theory of bombing the enemy civilian populace into submission, RAF Bomber Command heavy bombers mainly took to the skies at night to begin the Strategic Area Bombing Campaign. The RAF still bombed during the day, but usually only with medium and light bombers. Starting in 1941, these raids were heavily escorted; sometimes two squadrons of bombers would be protected by 12 squadrons of fighters. The targets available to RAF day bombers was limited by the range of RAF fighters, so not many targets were hit outside France, Holland and Belgium before the invasion in 1944.

The Americans arrived on the scene in Britain in 1942. The first raid was a small one in July, with only one squadron of B-17s hitting and easy target in France. More men and material were to follow. The leaders who had attended ATS in Alabama were now in charge of the 8th Air Force, and the opinion of the Americans was that RAF daylight bombing had failed because their bombers didn't have enough guns to defend them from enemy interceptors. Spaatz and his staff began to look for single targets that, if bombed successfully, might cripple the German war effort. Some of the most promising (in American eyes) were ball-bearing plants and oil production facilities. If the Germany had no ball-bearings or fuel, they would not be able to run their military machinery. However, in order to knock them out of production, a high amount of explosive would have to be delivered on target, and that could only be done by daylight.

During 1943, VIII Bomber Command learned the hard way that the bomber did not always get through. B-17s and B-24s were suffering unsustainable casualties in an attempt to knock out the German War Machine.

So how did RAF and USAAF react to the revelation that the bomber did not always get through?

The RAF could see that the "Total War" doctrine of Harris that dictated bombing enemy cities was not having a huge effect, other than the propaganda benefit for their own population. Harris was originally against what he called "Panacea Targets," or targets that would win the war in one blow. However, since night time bombing was not producing the results he wanted, he was far more amenable to the idea of a "Sniper Squadron" in 1943 than he would have been in 1940. The result is that 617 Squadron was born, and the Dambuster raid took place. 617 Squadron pioneered the concepts of ultra accurate bombing that have dictated a great deal of the airpower doctine in use today, but that is another topic. Another concequence of the lack of night time results was the use of the pathfinder system and the british use of intersecting radio beams for more accurate bombing. (I think the system was called "Oboe", but I can't find it at the moment...)

In November of 1943, the Americans could see why the British had turned to night time bombing. There was no way that VIII Bomber Command could continue raids deep into Germany and continue losing the crews and airframes it had to this point. However, the Americans went a different direction - the escort fighter. The problem of escort fighters not having long enough legs to get the bombers to their targets was an old problem, and both the Americans and British had been chipping away at it since the beginning of the war. However, the staggering American losses over Germany imparted a sense of urgency to developing better long-range external fuel tanks, and ultimately, the development of the A-36 into the P-51 Mustang.

With the advent of the Mustang over Europe in December of 1943, American Daylight Bombing became tenable. 8th Air Force was able to hit their "Panacea" targets, not with impunity, but at least not with such horrible losses.

The result is that the Luftwaffe pulled their fighters into tighter interior "lines". By May of 1944, nearly all Luftwaffe fighters on the western front had been pulled closer to Germany in order to better react to USAAF bomber raids. In preparation to the invasion, Eisenhower got control of ALL of the allied air forces in Europe, and bombed continental rail transportation centers to rubble.

By the end of the war, German aircraft and AFV production was higher than it had ever been, invalidating the ball-bearing plants as targets. However, Germany was suffering a terrible fuel crisis, imposed by allied bombing of POL production centers. Neither the RAF nor the USAAF had won the war, nor had they forced the enemy to its knees in the manner which they had predicted, but the following facts are incontrovertible:

1. USAAF Strategic Bombing forced the Germans to react by pulling their day fighters closer to Germany. This, coupled with the all-out air campaign against transportation centers in May of 1944 meant that the Normandy invasion was virtually unopposed by the Luftwaffe.

2. USAAF Strategic Bombing crippled the German ability to wage war in a time and place of german choosing by limiting the amount of fuel they had available to fight with.

Here are some responses to questions posed in the "Droop Snoot" thread.

1. Light Bombers and Fighter Bombers, though useful (and in some quarters indispensible) were not capable of delivering the weight of explosive on targets to knock them out with the accuracy that was required at the time.
2. In war, young men die. Sometimes they die in order to disprove faulty strategic thinking. If the incorrect idea was finally thrown down and replaced with war-winning doctrine, then I personally do not believe that they died in vain.
3. B-17s could not carry the load that Lancasters or Liberators could. P-38s could not carry any where near the amount of bombs that a B-17 could all the way to Germany. If a P-38 formation had come under heavy fighter attack on the way to a target, they would jettison their bombs and fight - such an enemy move would defeat the raid.

If any of you had the willpower to slog all the way through this, good for you! I tend to believe that it will be ignored as another long dissertation from that boring Smith guy...

I agree that the American concept of warfare has been informed heavily by the idea of "precision" bombing, though the execution was often a far cry from precise in many cases. There is also a cultural difference between the US and Great Britain that reinforced this idea. British cities were being bombed indiscriminately, whereas American cities were not. In many ways, the war for Britain was a struggle for survival by any means necessary, whereas, for the US (at least in Europe) it was above all a military campaign.

From a purely resources standpoint, precision daylight missions seemed to make the most sense. British Pathfinders with Oboe could be extremely effective at night, but the Bomber stream itself invariably had "creepback" often measured in miles. The lead aircraft might be dropping in the right spot, but the vast majority of Bomber Command aircraft were dropping off target because of the "stream" nature of the formation. Daylight bombing at least had some potential to redress this, though once precision radar bombing became popular with Gee-H and Micro-H in late 1944, the U.S. began to resemble the British approaches in some ways and bombing accuracy may well have declined in the last 6 months of the war.

I also suspect the more immediate BDA aspect of daylight bombing encouraged its use. Perhaps the greatest factor was the ability of the US to replace losses (late summer/fall 1943 aside) - i.e. we did it because we could afford it, whereas the UK could not.

The 20th AF campaign against Japan also shows just what the limits of the precision approach were, but that's a whole other topic.

[jim]

A lesser known consideration that Harris subscribed to was the long term view. What would Germany be after the war ended? In his mind he wanted to see a Germany devoid of any heavy industry. The point being was that if Germany was reduced to a rural economy there would be no possiblity of another war with them at a future date. The events after the war proved that it was a false belief and the rearming and rebuilding of Germany had to be done to counter the Soviet threat. (something that Churchill predicted in 1944). However the total destruction of German cities did instill in Germans the "Never again" mind set. Something that we should appreciate. We must not underestimate the effect of night bombing. It had a catastrophic effect on Germanys ability to wage war. it caused (as said in a previous post) a huge amount of much needed resources to be held back from the front. It also caused mayhem with manufacturing and transporting of all kinds of equipment for waging war. I read a British government report drawn up after the war of the effect the bombing campaign had on production of war goods in Germany. It listed factories communications and infrastructure that had been wiped out. In Germany it was quite common to site factories in built up areas. Thousands of smaller factories making key components were also sited in cities. Rail terminals road bridges and cannal junctions all important distribution networks and of course workers houses were all strategic targets within these cities. All of these were in many cases destroyed. We must look at the big picture, Neither type of bombing ,day or night was effective on its own. It was a huge joint effort. The relentless daylight raids followed by the night raids kept the Luftwaffe at full stretch and not able to bring to bear their might against our invading armies. In all the cost of the two campaigns was over 100.000 men (in some cases boys). Their sacrifice was crucial to victory and without that sacrifice the war would have rumbled on until the ultimate decision to use the Atom bomb would have had to be made. That last part is my opinion where as the the rest is indeed fact.

[chiefs70]

Well said and well done. I am currently reading Tail-End Charlies: The Last Battles of the Bomber War, 1944-45 by John Nichol and Tony Rennell which touches upon mainy of the things you discuss. I recommend it to anyone with an interest in the relationship and contrasts between Bomber Command and the 8th US Airforce. A very good read.

[Aircrafty]

bsmith, I feel there are a few facts that have been omitted from your post. The Germans were not overly impressed with the accuracy of strategic style bombing via vertical delivery and this was proved correct by the poor accuracy of both the RAF and USAF strategic methods. The accuracy of the USAF in daylight being not much better than the RAF/RAAF/RCAF at night. Saturation with large numbers of bombs being their only answer to this inaccuracy.

It was also proved that smaller twin engined aircraft as championed by the Germans were not as accurate as dive bombers but more accurate than larger four engined bombers. For example the Mosquito proved to be very accurate in bomb delivery compared to RAF and USAF heavies. And although it could not carry as much as the heavies it proved to be more effective and less vulnerable. In fact there is much to support the view that a switch to mainly Mosquito based bomb delivery would have been a better solution.

Have any of your educators mentioned the significant role the Russian Airforce and Army played in the defeat of Germany? Most German servicemen were used against the Russians, not the USAF or RAF etc.