[Hoverbug]

On Dresden, it might be worth considering it as a case of momentum rather than as a discrete decision. By this time in the war, both the U.S. and the U.K. arguably now had an excess of capacity. No one could legitimately argue against the use of this capability, but the net result was that targets that were not critical to being hit were hit simply because the capacity was there to attack fresh targets. This can really be seen in the tactical Air Forces, where by the Spring of '45, almost anything that moved was strafed. Inevetibly, this included a great deal of noncombatant traffic. In hindsight, this does not seem consistent with our national values on how war should be waged, but once a campaign of total war is launched, pulling punches is likely to be far less practical from a political standpoint than the risks of punching too hard.

Not to open another can of worms, but I would put the A-bomb decision in this category of momentum - i.e. even though the Manhattan project was not launched with Japan in mind, no one in the chain of command was going to put their neck on the line to turn down the use of a potentially war winning weapon, all other factors aside.

This type of thing has occurred recently as well. For instance, in Desert Storm, special Tomahawks were equipped with carbon fiber spools to short out transformers without permantly disabling Iraq's infrastructure. Unfortunately, this effort went to waste when these same power stations were assigned as secondary targets and were then blown to oblivion.

[timbo]

I know this is a bit of an old thread but I found the following web page from the RAF museum site that had some interesting information on the reasoning behind the Dresden and later bombing missions carried out by both Bomber command and the 8th airforce. Look at the entry for the 13th-14th Feb.

British Military Aviation in 1945 - Part 1

[bsmith13]

Thanks Timbo. Good info on that site.

[Migeater]

A bit off - thread ( and late)but I enjoyed this discussion and would like to recommend a book I just finished reading.
Dresden by Frederick Taylor
I don't know if you can get it in the US but the ISBN IS 0 7475 7084 1
It does not give an opinion on the morality but cuts through a lot of propaganda (British, Nazi and Soviet block) to get closer to the facts so the reader can come to a more informed personal view.

Personally I think the decision not to give Bomber Command a campaign medal purely because of political considerations was an utter disgrace.

[timbo]

Originally Posted by Migeater

Personally I think the decision not to give Bomber Command a campaign medal purely because of political considerations was an utter disgrace.

For all UK citizens or residents there is an on-line petition that can be signed for a Bomber Command medal. Not sure what good it will do, but it can't hurt. The link is below. Deadline for signing is the 27th May 2007

We the undersigned petition the Prime Minister to Recognise the courage and sacrifice of the men of RAF Bomber Command by instituting a Campaign Medal.

[chiefs70]

Originally Posted by timbo

For all UK citizens or residents there is an on-line petition that can be signed for a Bomber Command medal. Not sure what good it will do, but it can't hurt. The link is below. Deadline for signing is the 27th May 2007

We the undersigned petition the Prime Minister to Recognise the courage and sacrifice of the men of RAF Bomber Command by instituting a Campaign Medal.

I wish I were able to cast a vote myself on this one. The men of Bomber Command deserve better and hopefully they'll get their due before it is too late for all of the veterans.

[Cardinal]

Originally Posted by Hoverbug

On Dresden, it might be worth considering it as a case of momentum rather than as a discrete decision. By this time in the war, both the U.S. and the U.K. arguably now had an excess of capacity. No one could legitimately argue against the use of this capability, but the net result was that targets that were not critical to being hit were hit simply because the capacity was there to attack fresh targets. This can really be seen in the tactical Air Forces, where by the Spring of '45, almost anything that moved was strafed. Inevetibly, this included a great deal of noncombatant traffic. In hindsight, this does not seem consistent with our national values on how war should be waged, but once a campaign of total war is launched, pulling punches is likely to be far less practical from a political standpoint than the risks of punching too hard.

Not to open another can of worms, but I would put the A-bomb decision in this category of momentum - i.e. even though the Manhattan project was not launched with Japan in mind, no one in the chain of command was going to put their neck on the line to turn down the use of a potentially war winning weapon, all other factors aside.

This type of thing has occurred recently as well. For instance, in Desert Storm, special Tomahawks were equipped with carbon fiber spools to short out transformers without permantly disabling Iraq's infrastructure. Unfortunately, this effort went to waste when these same power stations were assigned as secondary targets and were then blown to oblivion.

Hoverbug, your argument is well constructed/reasoned and clearly one of the most objective on this issue to date.

The principle of 'momentum' (both managerial and administrative) is a complex one that many fail to understand when conducting 'post-mortems' using the benefit of hindsight and without giving due consideration of the context and times in which events transpired.

[SKUNKY]

Originally Posted by Cardinal

Hoverbug, your argument is well constructed/reasoned and clearly one of the most objective on this issue to date.

YEAH!..Go after 'im, Cardo!......Shame on you, Hoverbug!....

[Aircrafty]

Originally Posted by Cardinal

Hoverbug, your argument is well constructed/reasoned and clearly one of the most objective on this issue to date.

The principle of 'momentum' (both managerial and administrative) is a complex one that many fail to understand when conducting 'post-mortems' using the benefit of hindsight and without giving due consideration of the context and times in which events transpired.

Horse hockey Dresden simply wasn't a high priority target until late in the war when the Russians were attacking Germany.

[Hoverbug]

Originally Posted by Aircrafty

Horse hockey Dresden simply wasn't a high priority target until late in the war when the Russians were attacking Germany.

Do you have any evidence that we were shaping our strategic campaign to aid the Soviet advance? (I'm not saying we weren't, but I haven't come across indications of that before).