Another of Douhet's concepts was that "The Bomber will always get through". We now know this to be false, but those in power in the Luftwaffe, RAF, and USAAC all believed it. The Germans chose to design and pursue medium bombers that relied on speed (though if a key Luftwaffe leader hadn't been killed in 1936, the history of the war might have been different. But that's a different topic.) The Americans chose to design and build heavily armed bombers that could defend themselves. The British chose a mix of both design philosophies.
It is clear now in hindsight that the Germans never understood the strategic application of airpower. It is also clear now that the bomber will NOT always get through, but young men (on both sides) had to die in order to change that assumption. I will save the "Errors committed by Luftwaffe leadership" for another topic.
Early in World War II, RAF Bomber Command attempted many daylight raids in squadron strength against military and industrial targets. Some of these raids suffered 100% casualties; not a single plane returned. To the best of my knowledge, none of these raids were escorted by fighters. The British were finding out the hard way that the bomber didn't always get through. and the amount of airmen being killed in Bomber Command was so horrific that Air Marshall Harris changed tactics. Subscribing to Douhet's theory of bombing the enemy civilian populace into submission, RAF Bomber Command heavy bombers mainly took to the skies at night to begin the Strategic Area Bombing Campaign. The RAF still bombed during the day, but usually only with medium and light bombers. Starting in 1941, these raids were heavily escorted; sometimes two squadrons of bombers would be protected by 12 squadrons of fighters. The targets available to RAF day bombers was limited by the range of RAF fighters, so not many targets were hit outside France, Holland and Belgium before the invasion in 1944.
The Americans arrived on the scene in Britain in 1942. The first raid was a small one in July, with only one squadron of B-17s hitting and easy target in France. More men and material were to follow. The leaders who had attended ATS in Alabama were now in charge of the 8th Air Force, and the opinion of the Americans was that RAF daylight bombing had failed because their bombers didn't have enough guns to defend them from enemy interceptors. Spaatz and his staff began to look for single targets that, if bombed successfully, might cripple the German war effort. Some of the most promising (in American eyes) were ball-bearing plants and oil production facilities. If the Germany had no ball-bearings or fuel, they would not be able to run their military machinery. However, in order to knock them out of production, a high amount of explosive would have to be delivered on target, and that could only be done by daylight.
During 1943, VIII Bomber Command learned the hard way that the bomber did not always get through. B-17s and B-24s were suffering unsustainable casualties in an attempt to knock out the German War Machine.
So how did RAF and USAAF react to the revelation that the bomber did not always get through?
The RAF could see that the "Total War" doctrine of Harris that dictated bombing enemy cities was not having a huge effect, other than the propaganda benefit for their own population. Harris was originally against what he called "Panacea Targets," or targets that would win the war in one blow. However, since night time bombing was not producing the results he wanted, he was far more amenable to the idea of a "Sniper Squadron" in 1943 than he would have been in 1940. The result is that 617 Squadron was born, and the Dambuster raid took place. 617 Squadron pioneered the concepts of ultra accurate bombing that have dictated a great deal of the airpower doctine in use today, but that is another topic. Another concequence of the lack of night time results was the use of the pathfinder system and the british use of intersecting radio beams for more accurate bombing. (I think the system was called "Oboe", but I can't find it at the moment...)
In November of 1943, the Americans could see why the British had turned to night time bombing. There was no way that VIII Bomber Command could continue raids deep into Germany and continue losing the crews and airframes it had to this point. However, the Americans went a different direction - the escort fighter. The problem of escort fighters not having long enough legs to get the bombers to their targets was an old problem, and both the Americans and British had been chipping away at it since the beginning of the war. However, the staggering American losses over Germany imparted a sense of urgency to developing better long-range external fuel tanks, and ultimately, the development of the A-36 into the P-51 Mustang.
With the advent of the Mustang over Europe in December of 1943, American Daylight Bombing became tenable. 8th Air Force was able to hit their "Panacea" targets, not with impunity, but at least not with such horrible losses.
The result is that the Luftwaffe pulled their fighters into tighter interior "lines". By May of 1944, nearly all Luftwaffe fighters on the western front had been pulled closer to Germany in order to better react to USAAF bomber raids. In preparation to the invasion, Eisenhower got control of ALL of the allied air forces in Europe, and bombed continental rail transportation centers to rubble.
By the end of the war, German aircraft and AFV production was higher than it had ever been, invalidating the ball-bearing plants as targets. However, Germany was suffering a terrible fuel crisis, imposed by allied bombing of POL production centers. Neither the RAF nor the USAAF had won the war, nor had they forced the enemy to its knees in the manner which they had predicted, but the following facts are incontrovertible:
1. USAAF Strategic Bombing forced the Germans to react by pulling their day fighters closer to Germany. This, coupled with the all-out air campaign against transportation centers in May of 1944 meant that the Normandy invasion was virtually unopposed by the Luftwaffe.
2. USAAF Strategic Bombing crippled the German ability to wage war in a time and place of german choosing by limiting the amount of fuel they had available to fight with.
Here are some responses to questions posed in the "Droop Snoot" thread.
1. Light Bombers and Fighter Bombers, though useful (and in some quarters indispensible) were not capable of delivering the weight of explosive on targets to knock them out with the accuracy that was required at the time.
2. In war, young men die. Sometimes they die in order to disprove faulty strategic thinking. If the incorrect idea was finally thrown down and replaced with war-winning doctrine, then I personally do not believe that they died in vain.
3. B-17s could not carry the load that Lancasters or Liberators could. P-38s could not carry any where near the amount of bombs that a B-17 could all the way to Germany. If a P-38 formation had come under heavy fighter attack on the way to a target, they would jettison their bombs and fight - such an enemy move would defeat the raid.
If any of you had the willpower to slog all the way through this, good for you! I tend to believe that it will be ignored as another long dissertation from that boring Smith guy...
